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The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank are two of the most important 
international organizations in modern times. Only a handful of developing countries have not 
participated in an IMF or World Bank program, and this list grows smaller every year. As a 
consequence, scholars from across the social sciences have been engaged in explaining the effect 
of IMF and World Bank programs on a diverse range of outcomes in development, education, 
health, conflict, economics and government policy. But despite being the subject of considerable 
research in all of these areas, we know very little about whether citizens in developing countries, 
some of which face grave problems, believe that international economic organizations (IEOs) are 
working effectively. This is a vital question for the debate about the role of the Bretton Woods 
institutions in the global economy and whether they are suffering from a crisis of legitimacy 
(Stone 2008: 617; Marshall 2008; Seabrooke 2007). Public opinion research can help to inform 
this debate and shed light on this important question. More fundamentally, it can help us to 
understand the reasons why some citizens think international organizations work, while others 
believe that they are failing to deliver. 
There are only a handful of studies on the determinants of attitudes toward international 
economic organizations. Evaluations of the economy, a staple of public opinion research, feature 
prominently in these studies. It is not surprising that the economy should be a key focal point in 
the literature. The IMF and the World Bank are perhaps the most influential and visible 
international organizations in modern times. Both organizations possess the ability to impose 
change from the outside, monitor policy implementation and enforce compliance. Few 
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international organizations have the same breath of influence and level of input into national 
policy making. Their ability to impose conditions in return for financial support has been a 
source of great controversy, with critics accusing them of undermining national sovereignty. 
Citizens that live in developing countries may fear the actual or potential distributional effects of 
an IMF or World Bank programs.1 This is quite plausible because previous work has 
demonstrated that governments sometimes use IMF programs to push through unpopular 
economic reforms (Vreeland 2003). Moreover, there is a substantial literature which has been 
resoundingly negative about the impact of structural adjustment in developing countries (Woods 
2006; Collier and Gunning 1999; Crisp and Kelly 1999; Noorbakhsh and Paloni 2001; Easterly 
2005; Abouharb and Cingranelli 2006). 
This study’s empirical focus is Sub-Saharan Africa, where the IMF and World Bank have been 
highly active since the 1970s. Surprisingly, we find that evaluations of the economy, ideology, 
and a range of socio-demographic factors including age, gender, employment status, health, 
education, and living conditions are not important determinants of ratings of effectiveness. 
Rather, we find that attitudes toward the IMF and World Bank are a product of an individual’s 
relation to the state. The greater an individual’s trust in domestic public institutions, the more 
highly they rate the performance of the IMF and the World Bank. Similarly, when an individual 
participates actively in civil society, we find that they tend to rate both organizations more 
                                                 
1 For example, they may draw a link between entering into an IMF program and harsh spending 
cuts. 
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favourably. When an individual has experienced corruption, however, they tend to award lower 
ratings. Taken together, our findings suggest an individual’s relationship to the state and 
authority, whether good or bad, trumps a range of other factors. 
The paper is organized as follows. First, we consider the role of the IMF and the World Bank in 
Sub-Saharan Africa and the extent of public support for both organizations in the region. Second, 
we place our work in the context of the existing literature on attitudes toward international 
economic organizations and show how this literature can be extended to in orporate political 
trust, corruption, and participation. Third, we present our methods, data and findings. The final 
section concludes with a discussion of the relevance of our findings to the wider literature on 
international organizations, development, and globalization. 
THE IMF AND THE WORLD BANK IN SUB-
SAHARAN AFRICA 
In the 1970s many Sub-Saharan African states came to rely heavily on the IMF and the World 
Bank (Woods 2006:141). Since this time, both organizations have assumed a prominent role in 
economic policymaking through regular consultations, technical support, and short and long-
term adjustment programs. Their work in the region has often resulted in them becoming highly 
visible in everyday politics. A good example of this comes from Nigeria. During the 1980s, 
President Major General Ibrahim Babangida “invited the entire country to participate in what he 
called a “town meeting” on the IMF. The New York Times reported that “Day after day on dusty 
street corners, in tiny shops and air conditioned offices, people are arguing, waving fists and 
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5 
shouting about the International Monetary Fund.” (Vreeland 2007:60-61). In 2014, both 
organizations are still heavily involved in economic policymaking in the region. The majority of 
the loans disbursed under the IMF’s concessional lending arrangements go to African states. In 
fact, the average stint of participation in an IMF arrangement is about five years and some critics 
have argued that participation has led to continued dependence on IMF and World Bank 
resources.2 The most extreme examples of ‘recidivism’ within the context of Sub-Saharan Africa 
are Mali, which spent 19 years from 1981-2000 in an IMF arrangement, Zaire, which spent 13 
years from 1976-89, and Liberia, which spent 15 years from 1963-1977 (Vreeland 2007:30, 58). 
However, some states in the region have had very little contact. For example, Angola didn’t 
borrow from the IMF until 2009 and Botswana, Eritrea, Namibia, and Swaziland have never 
borrowed.3 
Africa is even more important to the World Bank. Not only is the largest part of its 
organizational complex dedicated to Africa, but many within the Bank recognize that the future 
of global development efforts depends critically on how World Bank programs in Africa perform 
(Marshall 2008:47). There is also substantial variation in World Bank support across the region. 
In 2013, there were 212 active projects in Tanzania amounting to 9.95 billion US dollars – a 
                                                 
2 The figure of five years comes from Vreeland (2007). For a discussion of ‘recidivism’ in IMF 
lending see Conway (2007) and Bird, Hussain, and Joyce (2004). 
3 While some of these states have used IMF resources they have not used these resources 
under a conditional lending arrangement. 
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similar number to Nigeria where there were 162 projects worth 16.2 billion US dollars for a 
population that is 3.5 times larger. Moreover, some countries have had relatively little support 
from the World Bank; in 2013 there were only two projects in Namibia amounting to 0.02 billion 
US dollars and in three of the last ten years there have been no active projects. Recent work has 
found glaring weaknesses in the way in which support has been delivered in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Winters (2010), for example, has found that the World Bank tends to grant less autonomy to 
IDA-eligible states with higher levels of good governance, even though the opposite should 
prevail.4 In addition, Stone (2004) has found that IMF programs in Africa have lacked credibility 
because donor countries, especially France and the United Kingdom, have intervened to prevent 
the enforcement of conditionality. These kinds of weaknesses in program delivery may have 
deeper roots in the way in which both organizations are influenced by powerful member states.5 
A substantial literature has argued that both organizations could do more to be transparent, 
accountable, and democratic (Seabrooke 2007; Woods 2006; Thirkell-White 2005).6 It has been 
                                                 
4 Many studies have questioned the World Bank’s role in fighting corruption (Marquette 2004; 
Polzer 2001) and designing and implementing reforms in Africa (Harrison 2005). 
5 For recent work that has considered the question of control see (Breen 2013; Stone 2011; 
Copelovitch 2010). 
6 There is also a large literature on how voting rights should be re-allocated to strengthen 
legitimacy in the eyes of member states and the wider public (Strand and Rapkin 2005; Martin 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [D
ub
lin
 C
ity
 U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
7:0
3 1
1 F
eb
ru
ary
 20
15
 
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
 
7 
noted in some of this literature that African states, in particular, have very little input into 
decision-making: only two of the IMF’s 24 Executive Directors are from African states. Both 
directors represent the interests of 42 sovereign states yet hold only 4.84% of all votes – few in 
comparison to Germany, which by itself holds 5.81%.7 
Despite the many criticisms of the IEOs in the academic literature, it is important to stress that it 
is also possible that the IMF and World Bank have no impact on some important outcomes in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. For example, Dreher and Rupprecht (2007), find that IMF programs have 
no effect on market-oriented reforms. Furthermore, ordinary citizens in Sub-Saharan Africa think 
that both organizations are doing their job well enough. Figure 1 shows that a considerable 
majority of individuals rate the effectiveness of the IMF above five on an 11 point scale. In 
Malawi, approximately 40% of those polled awarded a perfect, followed closely by 
Mozambique, and Lesotho. Surprisingly, respondents from Mali – the country with the longest 
continuous spell under an IMF program – awarded some of the highest ratings. Citizens in 
Botswana and Namibia, where there has been relatively little IMF activity, awarded average 
ratings. By contrast, South Africans tend to be the more critical, with many citizens (but not a 
majority) awarding fewer than five out of 11 points. The same pattern holds for ratings of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
and Woods 2005; Woods and Lombardi 2006; Rapkin and Strand 2006; Bradlow 2006; Meltzer 
2007; Eichengreen 2007; Truman 2009). 
7 www.imf.org Access date: 13 October 2013. 
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8 
World Bank. In the next section, we discuss the literature which attempts to explain variation in 
attitudes toward international economic organizations. 
PUBLIC OPINION AND INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS 
Scholars of international relations have theorized the functions and benefits of international 
organizations, arguing that they have the potential to constrain great powers, provide 
information, reduce transaction costs, facilitate reciprocity among states, and facilitate reform in 
domestic politics (Keohane 1984; Milner 2005; Dai 2007). While all of these functions can help 
developing countries, this literature has also identified a number of recurring problems with 
international organizations: sometimes they are simply not effective; sometimes they do not do 
their job well because of institutional design (Hawkins, Lake, Nielson, and Tierney, 2006) and 
the accumulation of internal dysfunctions (Barnett and Finnemore 2004); and sometimes they are 
prone to capture by powerful countries and private interests (Stone 2011; Gould 2006). However, 
studies of international organizations do not often incorporate a view from the citizens. To our 
knowledge there are only two previous studies on the determinants of attitudes toward 
international economic organizations. These studies have explored variation in beliefs about a) 
the influence of international economic organizations, and b) whether respondents trust them to 
manage globalization. 
Utilizing data from the Pew Global Attitudes Survey conducted in 2002, Edwards (2009) 
analyzed responses to the question “Is the influence of international organizations like the IMF, 
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9 
World Bank and World Trade Organization very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad or very 
bad in (survey country)?” Edwards finds that more educated respondents are less inclined to 
support IEOs, women are more likely to support IEOs, and left-wing respondents are more likely 
to hold negative views of IEOs. Hessami (2011), using data from the Eurobarometer survey, 
analyzed responses to the question: “Globalization is a general opening up of all economies, 
which leads to the creation of a truly world-wide market. From the following list, who do you 
trust most to get the effects of globalization under control?” Hessami finds that a range of 
individual characteristics explain answers to this question better than individuals’ evaluations of 
the economy. Furthermore, the study exploits the Eurobarometer’s more detailed questions on 
the WTO, and finds that attitudes are shaped by knowledge about the WTO and beliefs that the 
EU is well-represented in the WTO. Like previous studies, we consider the key variables from 
the wider literature on attitudes toward economic reform. This literature emphasizes sociotropic 
variables, prospective views on the future path of the economy, education, and gender (Edwards 
2009:188-191). Unlike previous studies, however, our dependent variable is coded from a 
question about the effectiveness of IEOs, rather than perceptions about trust and influence. 
Moreover, we argue that it is necessary to consider two key variables – trust and corruption – as 
both have proven central to the wider literature on attitudes toward international organizations 
and world affairs. 
International Economic Organizations: The Role of Trust and Corruption 
With few studies on the attitudes toward IEOs, the wider literature on attitudes to foreign policy 
and attitudes to other international organizations is relevant. Trust is a very important concept in 
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this literature. In domestic politics, one of the main reasons why citizens trust government is 
because of its capacity “to make credible commitments, to design and implement policies non-
arbitrarily, and to demonstrate competence” (Levi and Stoker 2000:484). Trust is necessary 
because it is costly for citizens to know if government will act in their interests. The need for 
trust is even greater when one considers international organizations, whose inner workings and 
operations are opaque to most citizens. At the same time, some of their basic functions overlap 
with domestic institutions. Take the World Bank, for example, one of its core functions is to 
transfer resources from richer to developing countries through project-based lending. Domestic 
institutions, when they function well, also redistribute resources from rich to poor. Given some 
of these basic similarities it is plausible that citizens’ beliefs about domestic institutions may 
contribute to their rating of IEOs. However, it is even more difficult for citizens in developing 
countries to obtain information about the IMF and the World Bank. Survey evidence 
demonstrates that citizens believe they have least influence at the international level (Vaubel 
2006:125). Focusing on the United States, Brewer and Steenbergen (2002) find that citizens use 
interpersonal trust as a shortcut to help them understand foreign policy issues such as 
isolationism and international cooperation. Moreover, Brewer, Gross, Aday, and Willnat (2004) 
find evidence that citizens who are cynical about politics are also cynical about international 
relations. 
Even more relevant to our study is Torgler (2008), who finds that trust in domestic institutions 
and the level of corruption, affects individuals’ confidence in the United Nations (UN). Torgler’s 
study on the extent to which individuals have confidence in the UN is closely related to the 
question we are interested in – whether individuals think IEOs are effective. The link between 
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trust and effectiveness has interested academics from across the social sciences. Economists have 
found that higher levels of trust and participation under experimental conditions lead to greater 
provision of public goods (Anderson, Mellor, and Milyo, 2004). Social psychologists have found 
that trust is strongly associated with perceptions of fairness and collective efficacy (Cremer 
1999: 153). Given the importance of trust as a concept for helping us to explain support for 
international organizations and its role in helping us to explain individuals’ beliefs about 
effectiveness, we wish to test the effect of trust on ratings of the IEOs. 
H1: A higher level of political trust is associated with more positive evaluations of the IMF 
and World Bank 
Corruption is another important concept in the wider literature on attitudes to international 
organizations. For example, Torgler (2008:78) has found that citizens who perceive higher levels 
of corruption in society tend to distrust the United Nations. However, he found that the effect of 
corruption is not robust to the inclusion of the level of political trust. One possible explanation 
for Torgler’s mixed findings is that corruption is a notoriously difficult concept to capture in 
quantitative research (Tanzi 1998). Like most cross-national studies on corruption and many 
survey-based studies, Torgler’s uses individuals’ perceptions about corruption, which are not the 
same as the actual level of corruption. One of advantages of the Afrobarometer study is that it is 
possible to build a measure of experienced corruption – one that is more reliable than perceived 
corruption. Citizens that have been compelled to pay bribes to obtain documents, to access 
medical care, or to avoid problems with the police have direct experience of the failure of their 
public institutions and may project this failure to international organizations, too. As such, we 
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expect a link between corruption and perceptions of IEO effectiveness. On the other hand, 
corruption may have become so widespread and deep in some societies that it is widely tolerated 
or not associated with attitudes toward IEOs, which may be seen to be above corrupt domestic 
institutions. However, given Torgler’s and Brewer et al.’s argument and findings, this seems less 
likely. In the absence of specific information on the activities of the IMF and the World Bank, 
we expect citizens to turn to their own positive or negative experience of domestic public 
institutions to rate IEO effectiveness. 
H2: A higher level of (experienced) corruption is associated with less positive evaluations of 
the IMF and the World Bank 
Another plausible determinant of attitudes toward international economic organizations (though 
it has not received as much attention in the broader literature) is participation in civil society. 
Both the concept of participation and the benefits of a vibrant civil society have led to a 
substantial literature in recent years (Fukuyama 2001; Lavalle, Acharya, and Houtzager 2005). 
There are a number of plausible channels through which participation might affect ratings. One 
channel is through more direct contact with international economic organizations. In recent 
years, IEOs have embraced the idea that civil society matters and have adopted the language of 
participation and engagement. In 1999, the IMF and the World Bank launched the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) process to facilitate civil society participation in economic 
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adjustment programs.8 Moreover, IMF programs and staff surveillance missions now include 
meetings with representatives of civil society organizations and a range of domestic stakeholders 
(IMF 2014). Some of these efforts to engage with civil society may lead participating individuals 
to award higher ratings. Another plausible channel is financial support for civil society. In 2009, 
civil society organizations were actively involved in 82% of World Bank financed projects 
(World Bank 2014). The World Bank estimates that in 2013, 10% of its annual funding portfolio 
(or approximately 2 billion dollars) was used to support community development projects or 
social funds to support civil society efforts and strengthen community organizations (World 
Bank 2014). 
H3: Participation in civil society is associated with more positive evaluations of the IMF and 
the World Bank 
DATA AND METHOD 
The data for this paper come from the Afrobarometer. The Afrobarometer is a representative 
cross sectional survey of public perceptions, social and economic conditions and political 
attitudes in Sub-Saharan Africa. Round 2 of the survey asked respondents to rate the 
effectiveness of the IMF and the World Bank. It was conducted in 2002 and 2003 in 16 countries 
– Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, 
                                                 
8 There is substantial literature which is critical of PRSPs and questions whether they are 
genuinely participatory (Gaynor 2010; Gould 2005; Craig and Porter 2002). 
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14 
Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.9 All of these have 
the necessary data for our purposes bar Zimbabwe. 
Our dependent variables come from the following question: 
"Giving marks out of ten, where 0 is very badly and 10 is very well, how well do you think the 
following institutions do their jobs? Or haven’t you heard enough about the institution to have an 
opinion? International Monetary Fund\The World Bank” 
Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of our IMF dependent variable by country and overall. It 
shows substantial variation in the distribution of ratings both within and across countries. The 
same is true of ratings of the World Bank. We can see from the Appendix that the mean value of 
each variable is about the same – 6.3 for the IMF and 6.6 for the World Bank and both are highly 
correlated (≈0.76). 
To measure political trust we use information from several questions in the Afrobarometer that 
take the form “How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about 
them to say?” We use the questions relating to the parliament, the army, the ruling party, the 
opposition, the courts, the police and the local government. Each of these can be answered “not 
at all”, “a little bit”, “a lot” and “a very great deal” to which we assign the values 0-3 
                                                 
9 The data and full methodology can be obtained from www.afrobarometer.org. 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [D
ub
lin
 C
ity
 U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
7:0
3 1
1 F
eb
ru
ary
 20
15
 
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
 
15 
respectively. By summing over our seven categories we obtain an index of political trust that 
ranges from 0-21.10 
The Afrobarometer is particularly suited for testing H2 as it contains information on individuals’ 
experience of corruption as opposed to perceptions. Specifically, it has information on how often 
the respondent has had to pay a bribe in several situations. The survey question is: “In the past 
year, how often (if ever) have you had to pay a bribe, give a gift, or do a favour to government 
officials in order to X?” We use the questions on obtaining documents and permits, school 
placements, household services, avoiding problems with the police, and “other.” The range of 
responses is “never”, “once or twice”, “a few times”, and “often”, to which we attach values 0-3 
respectively.11 As in the case of political trust, we sum these to create an experience of 
corruption index which, in this case, takes values from 0-15. The descriptive statistics for this 
new measure show that more than half of all respondents have no experience of corruption (at 
least in the areas covered by the survey, which are fairly exhaustive). Even so, many people have 
some experience of this type of corruption, which varies greatly by country (4% in Botswana, 
21% in Ghana and 42% in Nigeria for example). 
                                                 
10 We exclude trust in the presidency as the personality and leadership qualities of the 
individual may trump trust in the institution of the presidency. Our index of political trust 
contains substantial within and cross country variation. 
11 The survey in Mozambique allowed the additional response of ‘always.’ Very few people 
opted for this so we added those that did into the “often” group. 
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16 
To test H3, we make use of information regarding membership of a community development 
organization (CDA). The information comes from the question: “…could you tell me whether 
you are an official leader, an active member, an inactive member, or not a member (of a) 
community development or self-help association?” Specifically, we create a dummy variable 
which takes a value of one if the respondent reports that he is an “official leader” or “active 
member” of a CDA and zero otherwise. While CDAs (or self-help associations) can have many 
purposes, we are interested in capturing some level of participation in civil society. By our 
measurement, 19% of our sample is active in civil society and there is significant variation in 
membership across the Afrobarometer countries. 
In line with previous studies on attitudes to international organizations, we control for a range of 
important factors identified in the literature on attitudes toward economic reform. First, we 
consider socio-demographic and economic variables including age, gender, urban or rural status, 
employment, health, level of education, a lived poverty index, and (perception of) relative living 
conditions. Second, we consider individuals’ evaluations of the macro-economy. Taking 
inspiration from the literature on economic voting, we consider individuals’ evaluations of the 
recent past, present, and prospects for the future (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000). The idea is 
that individuals may reward IEOs in economic good times and blame them in bad times. 
Moreover, individuals may act according to sociotropic models and reward IEOs for general 
economic performance, whereas individuals acting in accordance with “pocketbook” 
explanations will reward IEOs for changes in their personal living conditions. Third, we control 
for a range of attitudes and ideological positions pertaining to employment, social identity, and 
the government’s role in the economy, including attitudes to protectionism, inequality, the rating 
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of government effectiveness with regards to price stability, group versus national identity, 
economic reforms versus hardships, and quantity versus quality of jobs. 
The Appendix presents the mean and standard deviation of each of the variables used in this 
paper and provides a description of how the variables are coded. Our basic regression of interest 
is: 
RATINGi = α + β1PTi + β2CORi + β3CDAi + βxXi + εi 
where RATINGi is the effectiveness rating given by individual i to either the IMF or the World 
Bank; PTi is the political trust of individual i; CORi is the individual’s experience of corruption; 
CDAi indicates whether the individual is a member of a community development association; Xi 
represents the other variables; and εi is an error term of the usual type. 
EXPLAINING ATTITUDES TOWARD THE IMF AND THE WORLD BANK 
Main Results 
Table 1 presents our key findings from our OLS regressions. As expected, the political trust 
index is highly statistically significant and positively associated with ratings of the IMF and the 
World Bank. Moreover, the size of the effect is meaningful. Taking the results from the models 
with all variables included (columns 4 and 8), a one standard deviation increase in the political 
trust index (≈ 4.7) suggests an increase of roughly 0.31 of a unit on our 0-10 IMF rating scale 
and roughly 0.34 of a unit on the World Bank scale – a very similar magnitude. This is about 
12% of a standard deviation in the IMF variable (mean 6.3, SD 2.6) and roughly 13% in the case 
of the World Bank variable (mean 6.6, SD 2.6). Taken together, this lends support to H1, 
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suggesting that those who place more trust in domestic political institutions believe that the IMF 
and World Bank are doing a better job. Our findings also lend support to H2 and H3. The 
experience of bribery index is statistically significant in all specifications. Individuals who have 
experienced more corruption tend to think that the IMF and the World Bank are less effective. A 
one standard deviation increase in the bribery index (≈ 1.8) is associated with a 0.12 unit 
decrease in the effectiveness rating awarded to both organizations.12 We find that membership of 
a community development association (CDA) is a significant correlate of World Bank ratings. 
The size of the effect is similar to political trust effect above (≈ 0.25 of a unit on our 0-10 scale). 
In our results for the IMF, CDA membership is significant at 95% level in all but one of our 
specifications. One potential explanation for why the World Bank results are stronger is that their 
work is more relevant to community development associations and regional and subnational 
development projects. 
Surprisingly, we find little evidence that evaluations of the macro-economy are associated with 
how people view the effectiveness of these organizations. Similarly, a range of attitudes to 
government and society do not determine ratings of either organization. Ideological positions 
that are often presented as decisive, such as attitudes toward protectionism, income inequality 
and the role of government in society, do not appear to influence ratings. Even more surprisingly, 
                                                 
12 Our indices for political trust and experience of bribery impose the restriction that each of their 
elements and intensities matters equally. To test whether our results are robust to this restriction, 
we created alternative measures using principal component analysis. The details are available on 
request and the results are near identical.  
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attitudes to economic reform, a central function of both organizations, are not associated with 
ratings. However, age and higher education are consistently associated with worse evaluations of 
the World Bank but not the IMF. Again, as we have already alluded to, the Bank is more focused 
on development issues; its programs extend into many sectors, including agriculture, education, 
public administration, and governance. Older and more educated individuals may have more 
knowledge and experience of failures in development and may associate this with the World 
Bank.13 Nevertheless, some of the most serious challenges facing many people in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, including, poor health, high poverty and unemployment, do not shape attitudes toward 
the IMF or World Bank.14 This is surprising, especially in the case of the World Bank, who 
explicitly target health and lived poverty. Taken together, our findings suggest that political trust 
and corruption are closely associated with attitudes, trumping most other observable 
                                                 
13 While education is negative and significant in some of our specifications, recent work by 
Hariri, Justesen and Bjornskov (2013) finds that better informed citizens form more precise 
evaluations. Such individuals may be less likely to generalize from the performance of domestic 
institutions to that of IEOs. To test this we interacted corruption with education and find that it is 
positive and statistically significant for both IEOs. More educated individuals who experience 
corruption tend to award higher ratings. The results from this specification are available on 
request. 
14 We repeated the test using income deciles instead of our lived poverty index. This halves our 
sample and as the results are qualitatively similar we favour our poverty index. Results using 
this alternative are on request. 
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characteristics. However, it is important to note that unobservable individual-specific 
characteristics are likely to be very important. For example, we have no way of directly 
observing if an individual has benefited from a World Bank project or if an individual had a 
negative experience because of IMF or World Bank policies. 
We performed three robustness tests. In the first test, we present our estimates using an ordered 
probit model. This is necessary because it is easy to question whether a “5” on our 0-10 scale 
represents the same sentiment toward the IMF and the World Bank in Mali as in Mozambique. 
The best way to address this problem in the absence of panel data or a method like anchoring 
vignettes is to create broader categories.15 We create 6 categories: a zero category along with 
five others each taking two points on the original 0-10 scale. Table 2 presents the marginal 
effects for our main variables of interest. The two specifications correspond to those of columns 
4 and 8 in Table 1 and the results are in agreement with our findings above. In the second 
robustness test, we dropped attitudinal variables from columns 1 and 5 in Table 1. We did this 
because Fordham and Kleinberg (2012) have argued that attitudes toward economic policy are 
unlikely to be causally related. Excluding these variables (including political trust) does not alter 
                                                 
15 A different way to address this issue this is to run a simple binary probit with some threshold 
for a good evaluation. When we do this with a threshold of 5, both political trust and 
experience of corruption are highly significant for the IMF though for the World Bank political 
trust is significant at 1% but corruption only at 10%. CDA membership is not significant in either 
case. Results available on request.  
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our findings on the effect of corruption and CDA membership. In the third test, we fitted a 
multilevel model to explore the relevance of the country level. From this model, we find that 
only 3.45% of the variance in ratings of the IMF can be attributed to differences between 
countries and that our principal independent variables remain highly significant. Nevertheless we 
do not pursue this modelling strategy further, as Stegmueller (2013) argues that we should be 
cautious about interpreting the findings from multilevel models where there are only a small 
number of countries. 
Who Has An Opinion? Why Do People Favor One Institution? 
The data allow us to extend the analysis to examine why individuals have favoured one 
institution over the other, and why some individuals have an opinion in the first place. For the 
first of these questions, we have created two sets of dependent variables. The first takes a value 
of one if the rating of institution X is greater than that of Y and 0 if the rating of X is equal to or 
less than the rating of Y (IMFMORE and BANKMORE). The second takes a value of one if the 
rating of institution X is greater than that of Y and 0 if the rating of X is less than the rating of Y 
(IMFMORE2 and BANKMORE2). These are obviously two very closely related ways of 
looking at the question. 
Using the first set of dependent variables, we can see from the first two columns of Table 3 that 
women are more likely to rate the IMF as more effective than the World Bank. Older people are 
less likely to rate the World Bank as the more effective of the two. Poor health is related to a 
higher probability of rating the World Bank more than the IMF and vice versa.  This may seem 
inconsistent but one must remember that those who rate the institutions equally are in the 
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reference category. Thus, this result may be interpreted as saying that having worse health makes 
you more likely to rate one of the institutions as more effective. Finally, feeling that the 
country’s current economic conditions are bad is negatively associated with rating the IMF as the 
more effective. 
The second approach is necessarily symmetric. In columns 3 and 4 of Table 3, only gender 
matters, with women rating the IMF as the more effective agency. Taken together, these findings 
suggest that there is some role for personal characteristics and evaluations of the economy to 
matter for ratings of effectiveness. While they do not seem to explain variation in individuals’ 
ratings they do explain why individuals discriminate among institutions. There are a number of 
possible reasons why. One may be that one institution is more visible than the other in a specific 
policy area. Another is that one institution might target different groups or at least affect areas 
that different groups care about. Moreover, some groups may be more sensitive to the policies 
and programmes of one institution. A substantial literature has argued that IMF and World Bank 
programmes have harmed women in Africa (Gladwin 1991; Sparr 1994; Emeagwali 1995). 
Therefore, a plausible interpretation of our finding is that women might perceive the World Bank 
as more harmful due to its visibility, and consequently tend to award the IMF a higher rating. 
The second of our extensions, the question of why people have an opinion in the first place, is 
addressed in columns 5 and 6 (IMFOP and BANKOP). The reason we look at the determinants 
of opinion formation is that 52% and 46% of respondents answered “Don't know/haven’t heard 
enough” when asked to rate the IMF and World Bank respectively. Looking at the two last 
specifications in Table 3, we can see that there is a role for personal characteristics in the 
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formation of opinions. Being a woman, a perception of worse relative living conditions, and 
negative appraisals of the current state of the economy are negatively associated with having an 
opinion of each institution. Living in an urban area, education (at each stage), experience of 
corruption, membership of CDA, and having a government salary in the household are positively 
associated with having an opinion of each institution. The only factor that is significant in one 
case and not the other is satisfaction with the government’s reduced economic role, which is 
positively associated with having an opinion about the IMF. These findings stand in contrast to 
our earlier findings on ratings, which tend to focus exclusively on political trust, corruption and 
involvement in a CDA. Personal characteristics do seem to play a role in what could be seen a 
first stage of a ratings formation process. And furthermore, some of these characteristics point 
toward a common theme: more vulnerable individuals that are potentially marginalized or 
disengaged from society (whether through gender discrimination or unemployment) are less 
likely to report an opinion about the IMF and the World Bank. In an additional robustness check, 
we generated the predicted probability of an individual holding an opinion and included this as 
an explanatory variable in our tests on the determinants of ratings. The findings were broadly 
similar except that our finding on corruption is only significant at 10% for the World Bank. 16 
CONCLUSIONS 
The question of whether international organizations are working is a vital question for a 
substantial literature on globalization, development and international organizations (Buchanan 
                                                 
16 Full results available on request. 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [D
ub
lin
 C
ity
 U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
7:0
3 1
1 F
eb
ru
ary
 20
15
 
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
 
24 
and Keohane 2006; Barnett and Duvall 2005; McGrew and Held 2002). What this literature – 
and the debate about whether IEOs are working – is often missing is a view from the citizens. In 
this article, we have illustrated a strong association between ratings of the IMF and the World 
Bank, political trust, corruption and participation in civil society. By contrast, a range of personal 
characteristics, socio-demographic factors, and ideological dispositions did not affect 
individuals’ ratings but did contribute somewhat to opinion formation and differential 
assessments of both organizations. Our findings are somewhat encouraging for the IEOs. They 
suggest that citizens may not perceive the same existential crisis as some academics, policy 
makers, and civil society organizations. However, our findings suggest that if the IMF and the 
World Bank wish to build legitimacy they need to ask whether, and under what conditions, their 
programs might undermine trust in public institutions. More research is needed to understand the 
extent to which programs might undermine trust and how programs can be designed to build 
effective public institutions.17 Our findings suggest that supporting and engaging with civil 
society and supporting measures to curb corruption may help to build legitimacy. Another 
implication from our study is that IMF and World Bank programs, and governments across Sub-
Saharan Africa, should support measures to improve institutional quality. This implication is not 
                                                 
17 Existing studies suggest that programs can be highly disruptive. For example, Hartzell, 
Hoddie, and Bauer (2010) have found an association between the adoption of IMF programs 
and the onset of civil war. 
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unique to our study or oblivious to policy makers: there is now a wealth of literature on the 
importance of institutional quality to developing countries.18 
As well as contributing to the debate about whether international organizations are working, our 
findings also contribute modestly to an important debate about the responsibilities and 
obligations of international institutions to help developing countries. Within this debate, Pogge 
(2002) has argued that not only have international institutions failed to live up to their 
obligations but that they are harming poor countries and have an obligation to stop. Rawls 
(1999), on the other hand, has argued that justice is relevant only domestically and that no such 
obligation applies. Public opinion research of citizens in developing countries can help to inform 
this debate by illustrating how citizens view international institutions and whether they perceive 
harm, inefficiency, irrelevance, or threat. Our basic findings suggest that citizens in Sub-Saharan 
Africa relate to IEOs as if they were another feature of domestic politics, and believe that for the 
most part they are working well enough. 
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FIGURE 1 Opinions of the IMF in the Afrobarometer countries. 
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APPENDIX 
Variable Mean  (S.D) Obs. Description 
IMF 6.31 
11020 
“Giving marks out of ten, where 0 is very 
badly and 10 is very well, how well do 
you think the following institutions do 
their jobs?” 
 (2.62) 
World Bank 6.61 
12336 
 (2.60) 
Age  36.34 
22543 
“How old were you at your last 
birthday?” 
 (14.79) 
Female Dummy 0.49 
23165 Equals 1 if the respondent is female 
 (0.50) 
Urban Dummy 0.37 
23165 
Equals 1 if the Primary Sampling Unit is 
urban 
 (0.48) 
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Unemployed Dummy 0.25 
22982 
Equals 1 if the respondent is unemployed. 
Derived from the question “Do you have 
a job that pays a cash income? Is it full-
time or part-time? And are you presently 
looking for a job (even if you are 
presently working)?”  (0.43) 
Health (0-6 scale) 1.74 
22800 
Sum of two 0-3 scale indices of physical 
and mental health. Larger numbers 
indicate worse health. See 
www.afrobarometer.org  for details of the 
individual questions  ( 1.59) 
 Less than full primary 0.39 
23100 
“What is the highest level of education 
you have completed?” 
 (0.49) 
Primary or Some Secondary 
Education 0.35 
23100 
 (0.48) 
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Secondary Education 0.15 
23100 
 (0 .36) 
Post Secondary 0.09 
23100 
 (0.28) 
University Complete or 
Postgrad.  0.02 
23100 
 (0.15) 
Poverty (0-24 Scale)  8.56 
22508 
Sum of 0-4 scale indices of shortages of 
food, water, medical care, electricity, fuel 
for cooking and cash income. Larger 
numbers indicate more poverty. See 
www.afrobarometer.org for details of the 
individual questions  (5.30) 
Perception of Worse Relative 
Living Conditions 0.36 
22023 Equals 1 if the respondent indicates that 
they rate their living conditions compared 
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 (0.48) 
to those of other countrymen as worse 
and 0 if better or the same 
Political Trust (0-21 Scale) 9.41 
18957 See Main Text 
 (4.74) 
Bribe Experience (0-15 Scale) 0.70 
21772 See Main Text 
 (1.79) 
Member of Community 
Development 0.19 
22778 
Equals 1 if the respondent is an official 
leader or an active member of community 
development or self-help association 
Association (0.39) 
Government Salary in 
Household 0.25 
22943 
“Do you or your household rely on the 
income of anyone who works for the 
government? Including anyone who 
works for local government as well as 
central government or anyone who works 
as a teacher in a public school.”  (0.43) 
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Protectionist Dummy 0.67 
22287 
“Protect producers within our own 
country by imposing tariffs that make 
imported goods more expensive" over 
"import affordable goods from other 
countries, even if some of our own 
producers are forced out of business.”  (0.47) 
Prefers Fewer Jobs  with High 
Wages 0.13 
22930 
“Better to have higher wages, even if this 
means that some people go without a job" 
over "better for everyone to have a job 
even if this means that average wages are 
low.” to More Jobs with Low Wages (0.34) 
Rating of Governments Efforts 
at Price Stability 0.34 
22019 
Takes a value of 1 if the respondent feels 
that the government is doing fairly well 
or very well at keeping prices stable and 
0 if fairly badly or very badly.  (0.47) 
Inequality OK Dummy 0.38 
22630 
Takes a value of 1 if the respondent 
agrees that “It is alright to have large 
differences of wealth because those who  (0.49) 
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work hard deserve to be rewarded.” 
Abandon economic reforms vs. 
accept hardships  0.33 
21664 
“The costs of reforming the economy are 
too high; the government should 
therefore abandon its current economic 
policies” over “...for the economy to get 
better in the future, it is necessary for us 
to accept some hardships now.” Dummy (0.47) 
Satisfied with  government's 
reduced economic role 0.47 
20915 
Equals 1 if the respondent answers 
satisfied or very satisfied to “...the 
government has reduced its role in the 
economy. Overall, how satisfied are you 
with the way this policy works?” and 0 if 
they are dissatisfied. Dummy (0.50) 
Group Vs National Identity 
Dummy 0.39 
18251 
Equals 1 if the respondent would identify 
more with their ethnic group rather than 
the national identity (if they had to 
choose).   (0.49) 
Views Country's present 
0.50 22625 Equals 1 if the respondent sees the 
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economic condition country’s present economic conditions as 
bad or very bad. 
as Bad Dummy (0.50) 
Country's economic condition 
12 months ago was  0.36 
22378 
Equals 1 if the respondent sees the 
country’s present economic conditions as 
worse compared to 12 months ago. 
Worse Dummy (0.48) 
Pessimistic about Country's 
economic condition 0.23 
19601 
Equals 1 if the respondent thinks that the 
country’s economic conditions will be 
worse in 12 months time. 
in 12 months (0.42) 
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TABLE 1 Explaining variation in ratings of the IMF and World Bank 
 
IMF World Bank 
  
          
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
   
Political Trust (0-21 Scale) 
0.08
06**
* 
0.07
68**
* 
0.069
9*** 
0.066
5*** 
0.0790
*** 
0.0756
*** 
0.076
1*** 
0.0727*
** 
 
(0.01
12) 
(0.01
17) 
(0.012
0) 
(0.012
7) 
(0.009
66) 
(0.009
93) 
(0.011
0) (0.0110) 
Bribe Experience (0-15 Scale) 
–
0.05
02** 
–
0.05
33** 
–
0.063
0** 
–
0.068
5*** 
–
0.0566
*** 
–
0.0618
*** 
–
0.058
0*** 
–
0.0656*
** 
 
(0.02
32) 
(0.02
40) 
(0.025
8) 
(0.026
2) 
(0.019
7) 
(0.020
1) 
(0.022
2) (0.0219) 
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Member of Community 
Development Association 
0.21
0** 
0.23
3** 
0.212
* 
0.249
** 
0.224*
* 
0.251*
** 
0.206
** 0.239** 
 
(0.10
2) 
(0.10
6) 
(0.120
) 
(0.124
) 
(0.086
0) 
(0.090
2) 
(0.101
) (0.105) 
Age 
–
0.00
494* 
–
0.00
597*
* 
–
0.004
92 
–
0.005
29 
–
0.0071
8*** 
–
0.0092
9*** 
–
0.006
82** 
–
0.00912
*** 
 
(0.00
262) 
(0.00
285) 
(0.003
28) 
(0.003
46) 
(0.002
58) 
(0.002
73) 
(0.003
22) 
(0.0032
9) 
Female Dummy 
0.07
14 
0.07
79 
0.059
7 
0.075
8 0.0380 0.0294 
–
0.003
86 –0.0126 
 
(0.06
03) 
(0.06
20) 
(0.074
5) 
(0.076
8) 
(0.047
5) 
(0.049
9) 
(0.058
1) (0.0607) 
Urban Dummy 
– – – – – – 0.003
0.0107 
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0.09
63 
0.07
62 
0.126 0.102 0.0439 0.0403 14 
 
(0.08
92) 
(0.09
05) 
(0.092
3) 
(0.092
9) 
(0.083
6) 
(0.083
1) 
(0.089
9) (0.0889) 
Unemployed Dummy 
0.08
79 
0.07
94 
0.081
5 
0.046
5 0.0476 0.0103 
0.063
0 0.00907 
 
(0.10
0) 
(0.09
97) 
(0.118
) 
(0.120
) 
(0.089
5) 
(0.089
0) 
(0.105
) (0.104) 
Health (0-6 scale) 
0.00
865 
–
0.01
24 
–
0.005
68 
–
0.029
3 0.0175 
0.0097
5 
0.005
73 
–
0.00315 
 
(0.03
59) 
(0.03
70) 
(0.041
8) 
(0.042
3) 
(0.031
8) 
(0.033
0) 
(0.036
2) (0.0369) 
Primary or Some Secondary 
Education (relative to less than full 
primary) 
–
0.03
66 
–
0.02
80 
0.000
163 
0.038
0 
–
0.0581 
–
0.0310 
–
0.024
6 
–
0.00318 
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(0.09
80) 
(0.10
5) 
(0.123
) 
(0.122
) 
(0.083
6) 
(0.090
2) 
(0.110
) (0.109) 
Secondary Education (relative to 
less than full primary) 
–
0.02
37 
–
0.01
55 
–
0.037
7 
–
0.019
8 –0.103 –0.102 
–
0.098
1 –0.122 
(0.11
6) 
(0.12
3) 
(0.149
) 
(0.153
) 
(0.097
2) 
(0.105
) 
(0.128
) (0.133) 
Post Secondary (relative to less 
than full primary) 
–
0.20
5 
–
0.22
1 
–
0.196 
–
0.182 
–
0.351*
** 
–
0.355*
* 
–
0.298
** 
–
0.309** 
(0.14
7) 
(0.15
2) 
(0.159
) 
(0.156
) 
(0.130
) 
(0.136
) 
(0.150
) (0.149) 
University Complete or Postgrad 
(relative to less than full primary) 
–
0.31
4* 
–
0.33
6* 
–
0.276 
–
0.265 
–
0.537*
** 
–
0.510*
** 
–
0.496
** 
–
0.482** 
(0.17 (0.18 (0.202 (0.201 (0.178 (0.182 (0.203
(0.203) 
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4) 0) ) ) ) ) ) 
Poverty (0-24 Scale) 
–
0.00
930 
–
0.00
899 
–
0.014
0 
–
0.013
9 
–
0.0058
0 
–
0.0060
3 
–
0.006
60 
–
0.00704 
 
(0.00
843) 
(0.00
850) 
(0.010
4) 
(0.010
8) 
(0.007
62) 
(0.007
97) 
(0.009
44) (0.0101) 
Perception of worse relative living 
conditions 
0.11
5 
0.19
0** 
0.166
* 
0.210
** 0.0768 0.125* 
0.073
5 0.132 
 
(0.08
30) 
(0.07
82) 
(0.095
8) 
(0.091
9) 
(0.075
5) 
(0.073
7) 
(0.086
0) (0.0884) 
Government salary in household 
0.04
24 
0.05
07 0.114 0.117 0.0735 0.0631 0.108 0.0850 
 
(0.07
89) 
(0.08
11) 
(0.091
3) 
(0.093
2) 
(0.066
9) 
(0.070
7) 
(0.081
7) (0.0844) 
Protectionist Dummy 
  
–
0.018
–
0.018   0.029
0.0150 
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0 0 0 
   
(0.100
) 
(0.104
) 
  
(0.091
3) (0.0982) 
Prefers fewer jobs  with high wages 
to more jobs with low wages 
  
–
0.011
0 
–
0.048
2 
  
0.026
6 0.0369 
  
(0.125
) 
(0.132
) 
  
(0.117
) (0.121) 
Rating of government’s efforts at 
price stability 
  
0.162 
0.192
* 
  
0.070
4 0.0689 
   
(0.107
) 
(0.108
) 
  
(0.102
) (0.0997) 
Inequality OK Dummy 
  
0.080
8 
0.078
5 
  
0.063
7 0.0684 
   (0.090 (0.097   (0.081
(0.0840) 
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0) 3) 1) 
Abandon economic reforms vs. 
accept hardships Dummy 
  
–
0.053
7 
–
0.075
6 
  
–
0.063
8 –0.111 
  
(0.093
4) 
(0.102
) 
  
(0.074
7) (0.0812) 
Satisfied with  government's 
reduced economic role Dummy 
  
0.044
6 
0.023
4 
  
0.032
2 
–
0.00555 
  
(0.107
) 
(0.107
) 
  
(0.102
) (0.109) 
Group Vs National Identity 
Dummy 
  
–
0.109 
–
0.167
* 
  
–
0.045
9 –0.0976 
   
(0.096
7) 
(0.101
) 
  
(0.099
0) (0.107) 
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Views Country's present economic 
condition as bad Dummy 
 
–
0.08
26 
 
–
0.048
5 
 
–
0.0174 
 
0.0209 
 
(0.07
75) 
 
(0.089
3) 
 
(0.081
0) 
 
(0.0906) 
Country's economic condition 12 
months ago was worse Dummy 
 
–
0.00
598 
 
–
0.006
66 
 
–
0.0354 
 
–0.0805 
 
(0.09
26) 
 
(0.102
) 
 
(0.078
7) 
 
(0.0868) 
Pessimistic about country's 
economic condition in 12 months 
 
–
0.19
7** 
 
–
0.093
8 
 
–
0.128* 
 
–0.0911 
 
(0.08
69) 
 
(0.095
9) 
 
(0.074
7) 
 
(0.0826) 
Constant 
5.90 5.93 6.308 6.347 6.099* 6.156* 6.232 6.386**
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7*** 7*** *** *** ** ** *** * 
 
(0.27
4) 
(0.30
0) 
(0.362
) 
(0.383
) 
(0.226
) 
(0.245
) 
(0.313
) (0.342) 
Observations 
8,21
8 
7,47
7 6,200 5,695 9,143 8,236 6,847 6,222 
R-squared 
0.06
2 
0.06
2 0.064 0.065 0.077 0.079 0.074 0.076 
Standard Errors are clustered at the country and regional level and presented in parenthesis. All 
specifications include country fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 2 Explaining variation in ratings of the IMF and World Bank 
 Category 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   
 0 1‒2 3‒4 5‒6   
IMF 
Political Trust (0‒21 Scale) –.0015167*** –0.0026263*** –0.0043356*** –0.0029904*** 0   
 (0.00033) (0.00049) (0.00078) (0.00057)   
Bribe Experience (0‒15 Scale) 0.0015536*** 0.0026903*** 0.0044412*** 0.0030632*** –   
 (0.00057) (0.00097) (0.00164) (0.00109 )   
Member of Community Development 
Association –0.0060966** –0.0108183** –0.0183238**  –0.0134716** 0   
 (0.00268) (0.00453) (0.00773 ) (0.00616)   
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Observations 5695 5695 5695 5695   
  
World Bank 
Political Trust (0-21 Scale) –0.0013038*** –0.0022455*** –0.0043385*** –0.0042805***   
 (0.00028) (0.0004) (0.00067) (0.00064)   
Bribe Experience (0-15 Scale) 0.0011869*** 0.0020443*** 0.0039496*** 0.0038968*** –   
 (0.00041) (0.00064) (0.00133) (0.0013)   
Member of Community Development 
Association –0.0045418** –0.0079913** –0.0157771** –0.0163114**   
 (0.00201) (0.00324) (0.00638) (0.00693)   
Observations 6222 6222 6222 6222   
Marginal Effects from Ordered Probit estimation. Additional control variables listed in columns 4 and 8 of Table 1 n      
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clustered at the country and regional level and presented in parenthesis. All specifications include country fixed effects. **       
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TABLE 3 Explaining opinion formation and favouritism toward one institution 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
IMFM
ORE 
BANK
MORE 
IMF
MOR
E 
BANK
MORE 
IMFO
P 
BAN
KOP 
Political Trust (0-21 Scale) 
0.000
803 
–
0.0013
1 
0.002
24 
–
0.0022
4 
–
0.001
07 
0.000
201 
 
(0.001
57) 
(0.0016
8) 
(0.002
59) 
(0.0025
9) 
(0.002
29) 
(0.002
10) 
Bribe Experience (0-15) 
–
0.002
35 
0.0019
8 
–
0.005
37 
0.0053
7 
0.024
6*** 
0.021
1*** 
 
(0.002
68) 
(0.0038
1) 
(0.005
21) 
(0.0052
1) 
(0.004
35) 
(0.004
16) 
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Member of Community Development 
–
0.013
6 
0.0010
3 
–
0.016
7 0.0167 
0.067
6*** 
0.078
4*** 
Association 
(0.013
9) 
(0.0171
) 
(0.025
6) 
(0.0256
) 
(0.017
0) 
(0.015
9) 
Age 
–
0.000
215 
–
0.0012
6** 
0.000
621 
–
0.0006
21 
0.000
287 
–
0.000
190 
 
(0.000
546) 
(0.0005
46) 
(0.000
913) 
(0.0009
13) 
(0.000
571) 
(0.000
486) 
Female Dummy 
0.030
0** 
–
0.0142 
0.046
9** 
–
0.0469
** 
–
0.101
*** 
–
0.106
*** 
 
(0.011
7) 
(0.0154
) 
(0.020
7) 
(0.0207
) 
(0.015
0) 
(0.014
4) 
Urban Dummy 
–
0.0213 
–
0.0270 
0.079 0.102
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0.013
7 
0.027
0 
8*** *** 
 
(0.013
5) 
(0.0185
) 
(0.025
7) 
(0.0257
) 
(0.020
7) 
(0.020
5) 
Unemployed Dummy 
0.003
06 
–
0.0035
7 
0.006
73 
–
0.0067
3 
0.017
2 
0.026
1* 
 
(0.014
9) 
(0.0165
) 
(0.022
5) 
(0.0225
) 
(0.014
1) 
(0.014
2) 
Health (0-6 scale) 
0.007
75** 
0.0114
** 
–
0.000
286 
0.0002
86 
0.003
91 
0.002
97 
 
(0.003
93) 
(0.0052
9) 
(0.007
04) 
(0.0070
4) 
(0.006
38) 
(0.005
71) 
Primary or Some Secondary Education 
(relative to less than full primary) 
0.011
5 
0.0087
3 
0.004
54 
–
0.0045
0.217
*** 
0.194
*** 
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4 
 
(0.015
8) 
(0.0186
) 
(0.026
5) 
(0.0265
) 
(0.022
4) 
(0.020
4) 
Secondary Education (relative to less 
than full primary) 
0.016
3 0.0318 
–
0.005
47 
0.0054
7 
0.288
*** 
0.245
*** 
 
(0.016
9) 
(0.0244
) 
(0.028
7) 
(0.0287
) 
(0.029
2) 
(0.026
1) 
Post Secondary (relative to less than full 
primary) 
0.019
6 
–
0.0220 
0.041
1 
–
0.0411 
0.355
*** 
0.305
*** 
 
(0.018
9) 
(0.0241
) 
(0.031
5) 
(0.0315
) 
(0.027
0) 
(0.020
8) 
University Complete or Postgrad  
(relative to less than full primary) 
–
0.014
4 
–
0.0474 
0.011
5 
–
0.0115 
0.366
*** 
0.303
*** 
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(0.026
8) 
(0.0441
) 
(0.057
8) 
(0.0578
) 
(0.033
1) 
(0.031
2) 
Poverty (0-24 Scale) 
0.001
24 
0.0011
4 
0.000
953 
–
0.0009
53 
–
0.004
09* 
–
0.002
74 
 
(0.001
26) 
(0.0014
9) 
(0.002
12) 
(0.0021
2) 
(0.002
20) 
(0.002
14) 
Perception of worse relative living 
conditions 
0.005
85 
–
0.0047
9 
0.012
5 
–
0.0125 
–
0.045
8*** 
–
0.051
0*** 
 
(0.012
2) 
(0.0127
) 
(0.017
9) 
(0.0179
) 
(0.013
0) 
(0.013
1) 
Government salary in household 
0.004
93 
–
0.0055
9 
0.016
1 
–
0.0161 
0.045
7*** 
0.046
8*** 
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59 
5) ) 1) ) 2) 1) 
Protectionist Dummy 
0.000
733 
0.0096
6 
–
0.011
8 0.0118 
0.029
4* 
0.027
5* 
 
(0.013
7) 
(0.0140
) 
(0.018
9) 
(0.0189
) 
(0.017
0) 
(0.014
6) 
Prefers fewer jobs  with high wages  to 
more jobs with low wages 
–
0.000
804 0.0104 
–
0.006
12 
0.0061
2 
0.049
2* 
0.032
5 
 
(0.016
7) 
(0.0174
) 
(0.026
1) 
(0.0261
) 
(0.027
5) 
(0.021
5) 
Rating of government’s efforts at price 
stability 
0.007
05 
–
0.0407
*** 
0.037
8 
–
0.0378 
0.023
7 
0.020
4 
 
(0.016
4) 
(0.0146
) 
(0.027
3) 
(0.0273
) 
(0.018
2) 
(0.017
8) 
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60 
Inequality OK Dummy 
–
0.008
50 
0.0022
7 
–
0.016
2 0.0162 
–
0.021
5 
–
0.014
0 
 
(0.011
5) 
(0.0159
) 
(0.017
7) 
(0.0177
) 
(0.014
9) 
(0.013
3) 
Abandon economic reforms vs. accept 
hardships Dummy 
0.010
9 
0.0001
71 
0.009
12 
–
0.0091
2 
5.69e
–05 
–
0.000
616 
 
(0.013
2) 
(0.0145
) 
(0.019
9) 
(0.0199
) 
(0.018
1) 
(0.017
4) 
Satisfied with  government's reduced 
economic role Dummy 
0.018
0 
–
0.0019
7 
0.019
9 
–
0.0199 
0.051
6*** 
0.029
3* 
 
(0.011
1) 
(0.0136
) 
(0.018
4) 
(0.0184
) 
(0.015
9) 
(0.015
7) 
Group Vs National Identity Dummy 
0.001
0.0114 
– 0.0048 – –
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93 0.004
88 
8 0.012
0 
0.022
6 
 
(0.014
4) 
(0.0151
) 
(0.021
3) 
(0.0213
) 
(0.019
8) 
(0.018
7) 
Views Country's present economic 
condition as bad Dummy 
–
0.037
5*** 
0.0000
769 
–
0.047
5* 
0.0475
* 
–
0.040
1*** 
–
0.049
0*** 
 
(0.013
5) 
(0.0154
) 
(0.025
2) 
(0.0252
) 
(0.014
5) 
(0.015
1) 
Country's economic condition 12 months 
ago was worse Dummy 
0.003
39 
–
0.0005
83 
0.000
940 
–
0.0009
40 
–
0.015
7 
0.006
00 
 
(0.011
9) 
(0.0165
) 
(0.021
1) 
(0.0211
) 
(0.013
5) 
(0.014
6) 
Pessimistic about country's economic 
condition in 12 months 
0.025
1** 
0.0021
6 
0.031
1 
–
0.0311 
–
0.009
–
0.002
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [D
ub
lin
 C
ity
 U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
7:0
3 1
1 F
eb
ru
ary
 20
15
 
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
 
62 
29 75 
 
(0.012
4) 
(0.0179
) 
(0.020
4) 
(0.0204
) 
(0.015
5) 
(0.015
8) 
Observations 5,552 5,552 2,852 2,852 9,563 9,563 
Standard Errors are clustered at the country and regional level and presented in parenthesis. All 
specifications include country fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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